Future Prospects for Cooperation in The Nile Basin

Looking to the future, these three countries have to find a way to share the Nile’s resources equitably, or risk worse political relations, and conflict with the other riparian countries. The historical allocation of water on the Nile is from a colonial era, not representative of water and development needs of the 11 riparian countries in a modern world of growing water insecurity and greater unpredictability of precipitation events due to climate change.

 

A potential way for cooperation on the Nile basin could be the idea of benefit-sharing. This was proposed by Rawia Tawfik and tries to ‘broaden the scope of benefits’ to promote cooperation over the focus on water allocation that dominates the discourse on the basin (Tawfik, 2016). This could be sharing the financial costs of the GERD between the downstream states and Ethiopia, which would mean joint ownerships so that the use of the Dam could be managed with all country’s stakes accounted for (Tawfik, 2016). However, this is easier said than done because Ethiopia aren’t willing to have joint ownership as this Dam is an opportunity for them to develop their nation through electricity production, and having other countries priorities for the Dam would jeopardise this. There is also the transboundary context to contend with because even with joint ownership Ethiopia would still feel a strong claim to the Dam as it is on their land.

 

The Nile has been prevalent in Egyptian life for thousands of years, whether it be for agriculture, drinking or transportation. This historical and current reliance on the Nile means that thought of water insecurity in the region makes them more unwilling to negotiate and discuss a new way of managing the basin. Also, the hegemonic power used to be Egypt with their veto power on projects upstream, but the completion and filling of the GERD is bringing in a new era for the region where upstream states could become more powerful. Therefore, it is in the interest of Egypt and Sudan to find an agreement of equity and sharing to protect them from further water losses that could occur in the future if new negotiations aren’t ratified. The Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was introduced as a better way to manage the basin, but Sudan and Egypt refused to ratify it because of article 14. This article aimed for states to work together for water security, but Egypt and Sudan wanted a clause allowing them access to their existing rights, which would see them allocated almost all the water on the Nile (Salman, 2012). The politicisation of the Nile means that alongside water security concerns, Egypt and Sudan believe that Ethiopia can use it to pressure them on regional issues as well as the GERD talks (Tawfik, 2018). Given the inherently political nature of water allocation along the Nile it seems difficult to separate water distribution from the political power it gives to countries with higher allocations.